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Abstract
This paper is the first systematic analysis of the impact of diversification
on the performance of private equity funds. A unique data set allows the
exact evaluation of diversification across the dimensions financing stages,
industries, and countries. Very different levels of diversification can be ob-
served across sample funds. While some funds are highly specialized others
are highly diversified. The empirical results show that the rate of return of
private equity funds declines with diversification across financing stages, but
increases with diversification across industries. Accordingly, the fraction of
portfolio companies which have a negative return or return nothing at all,
increase with diversification across financing stages. Diversification across
countries has no systematic effect on the performance of private equity funds.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, the global private equity (PE) industry has expe-
rienced an enormous growth. According to statistics of Thomson Venture Eco-
nomics (TVE) new funds raised by PE firms worldwide have grown from USD 1.7
billion in 1976 to USD 192.3 billion in 2005, with a peak of USD 260.6 billion in
2000.1 Accordingly, there is a large and growing literature analyzing the return
of PE investments (Jones & Rhodes-Kropf 2003, Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003a,
Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003b, Kaserer & Diller 2004b, Gottschalg, Phalippou
& Zollo 2004, Cumming & Walz 2004, Cochrane 2005, Kaplan & Schoar 2005).
The majority of these articles study the relative performance of PE compared to
public markets. However, there is much less understanding about the impact of
diversification on the performance of PE funds. In this paper, I try to fill this gap
by examining the impact of diversification on the rate of return and the percentage
of loss of PE funds.
PE firms are able to diversify their funds across five dimensions: (1) ‘naive’ di-
versification across the number of portfolio companies, (2) ‘dynamic’ diversification
across time, ‘systematic’ diversification across (3) financing stages, (4) industries,
and (5) countries. While ‘naive’ diversification only counts the number of portfolio
companies in a PE fund, ‘systematic’ diversification takes into account the specific
characteristics of portfolio companies. Diversification across time adds a dynamic
perspective to account for changes in the economic conditions over the lifetime of
a PE fund.
The decision determining the composition of a PE fund and thus the level of
diversification, plays a crucial role in the formation of a PE fund. It is a long
term strategic decision that is difficult to change. The maximum amount a PE
fund is allowed to invest in a single company as well as in certain financing stages,
industries, or countries is fixed in the partnership agreement with the limited
partners, i.e., the investors. A deviation from this agreement is only possible if all
limited partners approve.
1 Thomson Venture Economics is a commercial provider of PE information. It runs
one of the largest databases on PE: VentureXpert. For more information, go to
www.ventureeconomics.com.
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The selection and oversight of private companies is characterized by serious
information asymmetries and principal agent conflicts (Chan 1983, Amit, Brander
& Zott 1998). As a result, PE firms specialized on certain financing stages, indus-
tries, and countries are expected to make superior selection decision and to add
more value to their portfolio companies compared to diversified PE firms. This
should turn into higher rates of return and smaller percentages of loss of specialized
PE funds relative to diversified PE funds.
In this paper, I evaluate the impact of diversification on the rate of return
and the percentage of loss of PE funds at the level of PE funds, because investors
invest their capital in PE funds; neither in portfolio companies, nor in PE firms.
An unique data set is utilized in order to analyze the impact of diversification on
the performance of PE funds. The data distinguishes itself from data sets used in
previous studies through its high level of detail. It includes information related to
100 PE funds containing a detailed description of 2,871 portfolio companies and
the complete cash flow histories between the portfolio companies and their funds.
For the first time, the data allows the exact evaluation of the diversification levels
of PE funds.
Very different levels of diversification can be observed across the sample of
100 PE funds. Some PE funds are highly specialized, whereas others are highly
diversified. For instance, the least diversified PE fund in the sample at hand invests
only in one financing stage, three industries, and one country. In contrast, the most
diversified PE fund includes portfolio companies in three financing stages, seven
industry segments, and 16 countries.
Controlling for a variety of variables, the multivariate regression analysis shows
only partial evidence in favor of specialized PE funds compared to diversified PE
funds. Although the rate of return of a PE fund is declining with the level of
diversification across financing stages, it is increasing with diversification across
industries. Diversification across countries appears to have no effect on the return
of PE funds. The results suggest that the advantage of specialized PE firms to
overcome the information asymmetries and principal agent problems inherent in
the selection and oversight of private companies have been overestimated in the
past. PE firms specialized in specific industries or countries do not seem to make
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superior selection decisions or to provide their portfolio companies with more value
adding services than diversified PE firms. In contrast, the costs of diversification
across financing stages appear to be quite high. An increase in diversification
across financing stages by one standard deviation around its mean is connected
with a decline of internal rate of return by 6.5 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
Accordingly, the percentage of loss, i.e., the fraction of portfolio companies
in a fund which return less than 0%, and the percentage of total loss, i.e., the
fraction of portfolio companies which return -100%, increase with the level of
diversification across financing stages. PE firms investing in multiple financing
stages seem either to fund a higher fraction of low quality companies or to give
less management support compared to PE firms which invest in fewer financing
stages. In comparison, neither diversification across industries nor countries have
a significant effect on percentages of loss and percentage of total loss.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, a summary
of related literature on the performance of PE investing is provided. Hypotheses
on the impact of diversification on the performance of PE funds are developed
in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the data set, addresses selection biases, and
describes the key variables. Descriptive statistics on the level of diversification
and performance of PE funds is presented in Section 5. In Section 6 the impact
of diversification on PE funds’ performance is analyzed. In Section 7 additional
robustness checks are described. Section 8 concludes the paper and discusses
implications of the findings.
2 Related literature on private equity
Provoked by the boom of the PE industry in the late nineties, the number of articles
on the return of PE investments has grown steadily due to the availability of larger
data sets and an increasing interest in PE. Among these, two different groups of
studies can be identified according to their unit of analysis. The first group of
articles investigates the performance of single PE investments (Gompers & Lerner
2000, Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003b, Cumming & Walz 2004, Cochrane 2005,
Ick 2005). The second group’s computations are based on PE funds (Ljungqvist &
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Richardson 2003a, Jones & Rhodes-Kropf 2003, Kaserer & Diller 2004b, Gottschalg
et al. 2004, Kaplan & Schoar 2005).2
Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg et al. (2004) report a positive and
concave relationship between fund size and rate of return of PE funds. The concave
shape of the relationship suggests a decreasing return to scale of fund size. In
addition, their results also suggest a positive impact of firm experience on the
rate of return of PE funds. The more experience a PE firm has at the time
of fund formation, the higher the rate of return of PE funds, ceteris paribus.
Kaserer & Diller (2004b) find a negative influence of the annual rate of return of
the MSCI Europe Index in the vintage year of European PE funds on their rate
of return. Next, an increasing amount of new funds raised by the PE industry
in the vintage year of a PE fund is associated with a rise of its rate of return
(Kaserer & Diller 2004b, Gottschalg et al. 2004). Moreover, Gottschalg et al.
(2004) report a negative influence of the fraction of the capital invested in Europe
on the rate of return of a PE fund. In the past, European PE funds achieved a
lower rate of return than their US counterparts. Finally, some authors report a
superior return of venture capital (VC) funds over buyout (BO) funds (Kaplan
& Schoar 2005, Kaserer & Diller 2004b), whereas other studies find no difference
(Gottschalg et al. 2004) or a negative difference between VC funds and BO funds
(Ljungqvist & Richardson 2003a). In order to review and control for these effects
I will include corresponding variables in my analysis.3
Much less is known on the impact of diversification on the performance of
PE funds so far. Ljungqvist & Richardson (2003a) find no significant influences
of diversification across the number of portfolio companies and industries on the
internal rate of return (IRR) for their sample of mainly BO funds. Schmidt (2004)
2 A third group of articles studies the returns of publicly traded PE vehicles, which will not
be further discussed in the scope of this article. For a recent study on publicly traded PE
vehicles compare Zimmerman, Bilo, Christiophers & Degosciu (2005).
3 Additionally, Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Kaserer & Diller (2004b) find a performance per-
sistence across funds of the one PE firm. PE firms who outperform the industry in one fund
are likely to outperform the industry in the next fund. Unfortunately, the return of preceding
fund is only available for 69 of the 100 sample funds. Hence, the return of preceding fund is
not included in the regression analyses of this paper. In unreported regressions with only 69
PE funds I also find a positive and statistically significant persistence across funds of one PE
firm.
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reports a decreasing variation of returns across simulated PE portfolios with a
rising number of companies in the portfolio. Moreover, Weidig & Mathonet (2004)
show that the probability of loss and total loss of VC investments decline from
direct investments in portfolio companies to VC funds, and from VC funds to
simulated VC fund-of-funds.
The cited studies reveal interesting insights. Nevertheless, there is a lack of
understanding about the impact of diversification on PE funds’ performance. This
paper contributes to this research gap by analyzing empirically the impact of diver-
sification across number of portfolio companies, time, financing stages, industries,
and countries on the rate of return and the percentage of loss of PE funds.
3 Theoretical aspects and hypotheses
The selection and oversight of private companies is characterized by serious infor-
mation asymmetries and principal agent problems (Chan 1983, Amit et al. 1998).
As a consequence, PE firms specialized in particular financing stages, industries,
and countries should enjoy at least three advantages compared to non-specialized
PE firms. First, before PE firms invest in a company they run a rigorous and
multi-staged selection process (Tyebjee & Bruno 1984, MacMillan, Zemann &
Subbanarasimha 1987, Birley, Muzyka & Hay 1999). During this selection process
the PE firm faces a substantial information asymmetry compared to the manage-
ment team or vendor of the potential portfolio company. Specific knowledge in
the technology and business of the potential investment assists the PE firm to
reduce the information gap, and hence, to distinguish successful from unsuccessful
investments.
Secondly, once a PE firm finances a company a principal agent problem exists
between the PE firm (principal) and the management team of the portfolio com-
pany (agent). The personal benefits the management team gains from running the
portfolio company might differ from the interests of the PE firm. Gompers (1995)
names two likely examples of projects causing agency costs: the portfolio com-
pany might pursuit strategies or projects that have a high personal return for the
management team but a low expected pay-off to shareholders, or the management
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team might invest in high variance strategies because their equity stakes are similar
to call-options. PE firms use various instruments to reduce such agency conflicts.
Among these are: the staging of capital infusions (Gompers 1995) and extensive
control rights (Sahlman 1990, Kaplan & Stro¨mberg 2000). The more knowledge a
PE firm has about the industry and markets of the portfolio company, the more
effectively it is able to execute stage financing and control rights.
Thirdly, PE firms claim to add value to their investments by means of en-
gagement in the managerial activities of the portfolio companies (Gorman &
Sahlman 1989, Hellmann & Puri 2001, Hellmann & Puri 2002). Again, the larger
the know-how of the PE firm in the activities of the portfolio company is, the more
value adding services the PE firms should be able to offer.
In summary, by means of specialization, PE firms should be able to make
superior selection decisions and to provide their portfolio companies with more
value adding services which in turn raises the rate of return of their portfolio
companies. As a consequence, PE funds specialized in specific financing stages,
industries, and countries should have higher rates of return and should lose less
of their portfolio companies (Gupta & Sapienza 1992, Norton & Tenebaum 1993).
The specialization hypothesis proposes a negative relationship between the level
of diversification and the rate of return of PE funds. Accordingly, it suggests a
positive relation between the level of diversification and the percentage of loss in
a PE fund.
4 Data and variables
4.1 Construction of data set
The core data for this paper is derived from the records of a European PE fund-
of-funds investor. The data set was collected manually between April 2004 and
October 2005. The information on PE firms, funds and its portfolio companies
were extracted from the due diligence documents provided by the PE firms to the
investor.
The data contains detailed information on PE firms, their funds, and funds’
portfolio companies. Concerning the PE firm, the year of firm foundation, the ge-
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ographic location of offices, and the funds managed since foundation is available.
For each fund of a PE firm the following data was collected: the vintage year, the
total amount committed, and the investment focus as specified by the PE firm.
Additionally, for each fund a complete listing of all investments is available. For
each portfolio company a set of descriptive variables was gathered. In particular,
the date of initial investment by the PE fund, the industry of main activity, the ge-
ographic location of the headquarters, and the financing stage at the time of initial
investment was stored. In the case an observation was unknown, the variables were
completed through the following external resources. If in existence, the website of
the portfolio company was scanned for additional information. Additionally, the
website of the PE firm was screened for supplementary data. If both sources did
not reveal the necessary information, the commercially available records of Thom-
son Venture Economics (TVE) were investigated. The information found in TVE
was only adopted if other variables for the portfolio company coincided with the
information in the due diligence documents. To measure the financial performance
of the PE funds the exact cash flow records between the fund and its investors net
of carried interests and the management fees were collected (in the following called
the net cash flows). For the same purpose, the exact timing and size of cash flows
between the fund and each portfolio company at the time of data collection were
saved (in the following called gross cash flows). In total, information on 227 PE
funds of 51 PE firms were collected.
In order to evaluate the performance of PE funds in this paper, I use a sample
of mature PE funds, for which the entire gross cash flow history between portfolio
companies and funds are available. Kaplan & Schoar (2005) report a correlation
of 0.89 between the final IRR and interim IRR after five years for a large sample of
PE funds. Their result suggests that the interim performance of a mature PE fund
is a valid proxy of final performance. The extent to which the interim performance
can differ from the final performance depends on the amount of net asset value
(NAV) at the time of the interim calculation. I define PE funds as mature and
include them in the analysis which have a NAV of less than 20% relative to their
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total value.4 To conclude, the sample used in this paper contains information
about 2,871 investments made by 100 PE funds of 34 PE firms.
Table 1 summarizes the composition of the sample. It can be divided into 38
VC and 62 BO funds.5 72 funds belong to PE firms with headquarters in the USA.
The headquarters of the remaining 28 funds are located in Germany, France, Italy,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The sample includes 21 first-time, 17 second-
time, and 14 third-time funds. The remaining 48 are PE funds with sequence
numbers of four or higher. Forty funds were already liquidated at the time of data
collection while the remaining 60 funds were still active. The active funds have an
average fraction of NAV of 6.4% compared to total value .
The average fund sequence number of sample funds is 4.1. BO funds have
higher sequence numbers than VC funds with means of 5.0 compared to 2.1, re-
spectively. Also, US funds in the sample have higher sequence numbers than
European funds (4.2 compared to 3.9). Finally, active funds show higher sequence
numbers than liquidated funds (4.6 compared to 3.5).
Fund size varies substantially across funds. The mean size of the three smallest
funds is USD 21.3 million, while the average size of the three largest funds totals
up to USD 4,761 million. The average fund has a size of USD 440.2 million. VC
funds have a smaller fund size than BO funds (USD 172.2 million compared to
USD 604.4 million). Fund size increases significantly with sequence number. The
mean fund size grows from USD 83.6 million for first-time funds to USD 759.2
million for funds, which have sequence numbers of four or higher. Equivalently,
liquidated funds in the sample have a much smaller size than active funds (USD
286.8 million compared to USD 542.8 million). Finally, US funds are on average
larger than European funds (USD 498.2 million compared to USD 291.0 million).
4 Kaserer & Diller (2004b) include PE funds in their analysis if their NAV is less than 20% of
the absolute value of all previously accrued cash flows. I follow this approach, however, with
a small distinction: I use the total value of a PE fund as reference for the NAV. Total value
is defined as the sum of realized proceeds and NAV.
5 A fund is categorized as VC if the fraction of its total capital invested in VC transactions
is equal to or superior to 70%. The remaining funds are classified as BO funds. Mezzanine
funds and pre-fund vehicles are excluded from the analysis.
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The oldest fund in the sample closed its first transaction in 1979; the youngest in
1998.6
Additional information is taken from commercially available data bases. The
annual amount of new funds raised worldwide by the PE industry is taken from the
statistics of TVE. The rate of return of the MSCI World Index twelve months prior
to the first investment of a PE fund and exchange rates to convert the fund size
of European PE funds to USD are obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream.
The yearly consumer price index of the U.S. Department of Labor was used to
express funds size and new funds raised in 2000 purchasing power.
4.2 Discussion of selection bias
The term ‘private’ is indicative of one of the main challenges for empirical research
of the PE industry. Since there is no liquid secondary market for PE investments
access to comprehensive data on PE transactions requires the collaboration of
insiders. As a result, most data sets used to study the PE industry are restricted
by size, level of detail, and/or selection biases.
The sample used in this paper has a unique level of detail but is not a random
sample. It consists of all VC and BO funds, which belong to a PE firm that
(1) undertook fundraising activities for a new fund between 2000 and August
2005 and (2) were asked by the fund-of-funds investor to provide due diligence
documents. The time span of longer than five years is larger than the usual fund
raising cycle of PE funds of three to four years. Hence, the sampling period is not
expected to cause any bias. However, it implies survivorship bias. No funds are
included in the sample that have a vintage year before 2000 and were managed
by a PE firm, which did not try to raise a fund between 2000 and July 2005.
This suggests that the funds of these PE firms started before 2000 generated a
poor performance. Discussions with partners of the fund-of-fund-investor indicate
that PE firms creating poor returns in two subsequent funds have a very low
probability of raising a new fund. Consequently, the funds included in the sample
can be considered a positive selection of the population in terms of return.
6 Figure 1 in the appendix displays the distribution of sample funds across vintage years.
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Additional selection biases could be caused by the investment preferences of
the cooperation partner. Because of a regional focus, no funds of PE firms, which
have their headquarters outside USA or Europe are included in the sample. This
does not restrict the analysis critically, as USA and Europe are by far the biggest
PE markets.7 Additionally, the cooperation partner only engages in due diligence
activities for funds of PE firms it rates as ‘high-quality-teams’. Some part of the
rating stems from past performance of PE firms implying again a positive selection
with reference to return.
A comparison of IRR net of management fee and carried interest (Net-IRR)
corroborates the survivorship bias. Sample funds have on average a superior per-
formance than the aggregated performance data provided by TVE. The median
(average) Net-IRR for US PE funds with vintage years between 1979-1998 re-
ported by TVE is 9.0% (18.3%), while US funds in the sample have a median
(average) Net-IRR of 28.5% (35.6%). The corresponding values for European PE
funds with vintage years between 1989-1998 are 5.5% (11.4%) and 26.3% (29.8%),
respectively.8 Most of the PE funds included in the sample belong to the ‘top-half’
performers within their peer group.
However, it is not expected that the relationship between diversification and
performance in the sample differs significantly from the relationship between diver-
sification and performance in the population of PE funds. First, although sample
funds have a superior mean return, there is still a huge variation in the sample
funds’ returns. Secondly, there is also a huge variation in the levels of diversifica-
tion across sample funds.9 Furthermore, in an additional robustness check I rerun
the analysis excluding the upper quartile of the sample with respect to IRR in
7 The limitation to US and European based PE funds does not mean that no investments in
companies outside USA and Europe are included in the data set. US and European PE firms
also fund companies outside their home markets. The distribution of portfolio companies
across countries is reported in panel C of Table 11 in the appendix.
8 Net-IRR was compuTable for 63 US and 27 European sample funds with vintage years between
1979-1998 and 1989-1998, respectively. TVE benchmark contains 1,138 US and 387 European
PE funds with corresponding vintage years. The benchmark reports in TVE were generated
April 17, 2006.
9 See descriptive analysis in section 5.
11
order to show that the results are not only driven by the top performing funds in
the sample.10
Moreover, in an unreported probit regression I evaluate whether fund size,
vintage year, the headquarters of the PE firm managing a fund, or the type of
a fund have a significant influence on the probability of a PE fund to enter the
sample compared to the average PE fund in the universe of PE funds in the sample
period according to the statistics of TVE.11 I find that BO and larger funds are
over-represented in the sample, while funds with higher vintage years are slightly
under-represented. These biases are not problematic as fund size and vintage years
are included as independent variables in the multivariate analyses presented.
4.3 Description of variables
4.3.1 Measurement of performance
As PE investments are only occasionally traded on secondary markets, return
measurement usually relies on the cash flow history of a fund. The objective of
this paper is to study whether specialized PE funds are able to make superior
selection decisions and to add more value than diversified PE funds. It is not the
aim to analyze whether specialized PE funds take higher management fees and
carried interests or are able to time their distributions differently from diversified
funds. As a consequence, in contrast to many prior studies, the performance of
sample funds in this paper is measured on the gross cash flows between a PE
fund and its portfolio companies, which are gross of management fees and carried
interests.
I measure the rate of return of sample funds in terms of internal rate of return
(IRR), modified internal rate of return (MIRR), and public market equivalent
(PME ).12 All three consider the exact timing and size of all cash flows between a
PE fund and its portfolio companies. IRR is the discount rate that yields a net
10 For detailed information see section 7.
11 Sample funds were identified in the universe of PE funds reported by TVE. All but two sample
funds could be matched to the records of TVE. In sum the probit regression contains 4,024
PE funds.
12 For a more detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various return measures
for PE funds see Kaserer & Diller (2004a).
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present value of zero for the cash flow history of an investment. IRR implicitly
assumes that interim cash flows are (re)invested at the same IRR. In most cases
this reinvestment assumption is unrealistic. Neither PE firms nor investors are
immediately able to reinvest in projects with the same IRR. MIRR reduces this
problem by making an explicit assumption about the discount rate for interim cash
flows (Dorsey 2000). Negative interim cash flows occurring during the investment’s
lifetime are discounted at a specific discount rate to period 0. Accordingly, positive
interim cash flows are reinvested at a specific discount rate until the last cash flow
has occurred. In this paper, I use a constant discount rate of 9%, which is equal to
the annual rate of return of the MSCI World Index during 1979 and 2005. PME
compares the investment in a PE fund to the investment in a public market index
(Kaplan & Schoar 2003). It is defined as the ratio of the present value of all cash
inflows to the fund (i.e., realizations of portfolio companies) over the present value
of all cash outflows from the fund (i.e., investments in portfolio companies) using
the public market index as discount rate (Kaserer & Diller 2004b). As the sample
contains European and US PE funds, I use the MSCI World Index as public market
index.13
Finally, I include net asset value (NAV) in the calculation of IRR, MIRR, and
PME. Gottschalg et al. (2004) document that the average ratio of present value
of future cash flows to NAV in December of each year after the eighth birthday of
a PE fund is 1.03. This implies that NAV in the last part of a funds’ lifetime is a
good proxy for future cash flows.
The specialization hypothesis also suggests that specialized PE funds show a
lower percentages of loss than diversified PE funds. In this paper I use two different
levels of loss: (1) percentage of loss (Perc(loss)) is estimated as the percentage of
portfolio companies in a PE fund returning less than zero percent; (2) percentage
of total loss (Perc(tot. loss)) is evaluated as the percentage of portfolio companies
in a PE fund with a rate of return of -100% (Dorsey 2000, Born 2004, Weidig &
Mathonet 2004).
13 Mathematical definitions for IRR, MIRR, and PME are displayed in Table 9 in the appendix.
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4.3.2 Measurement of diversification
PE firms are able to diversify their funds across five dimensions: (1) ‘naive’ diver-
sification across the number of portfolio companies, (2) ‘dynamic’ diversification
across time, (3) ‘systematic’ diversification across financing stages, (4) industries,
and (5) countries.
The variable number of portfolio companies evaluates ‘naive’ diversification
across a randomly selected portfolio of risky assets (Evans & Archer 1968). It
counts the number of portfolio companies N in a PE fund.
Diversification across time reflects how fast a PE fund spends its capital.
First, the start of a PE fund’s investment activities is determined as the invest-
ment date of its first portfolio company. Secondly, for each portfolio company the
time span between its date of investment and the date of investment of the first
portfolio company, i.e., the start of the PE fund’s investment activities is calcu-
lated. Thirdly, the time span is weighted with the fraction of the fund invested in
portfolio company i. Finally, the value-weighted average for a fund is calculated.
I calculate Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Indices (HHI) to measure diversification
across financing stages, industries, and countries in a PE fund. In order to do
so, each portfolio company is assigned to one financing stage, industry, and coun-
try. Each HHI is computed by squaring the fraction of capital invested in the
categories and then summing up the resulting numbers. Finally, for the purpose
of easy interpretation I subtract the HHIs from one. Hence, HHI takes on the
value of 0 for a fund, which is not diversified at all (i.e., a fund which invested only
in one financing stage, industry, or country), and the value of 1 for a perfectly di-
versified fund (i.e., a fund which invested in an infinite number of financing stages,
industries, or countries).
To measure diversification across financing stages I assigned each portfolio
company to one financing stage. The following five categories were used: (1) seed
and early stage VC, (2) second, expansion and later stage VC, (3) BO, (4) listed
securities, and (5) other financing stages.14 In most cases the categorization of the
portfolio companies provided by the PE firms was identical to my classification
14 Definitions of the categories are described in Table 10 in the appendix.
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scheme, and thus, the categorization to the categories (1) to (5) was without
difficulty. In cases where no direct correspondence existed, further search on the
status of the company at the date of initial investment was conducted in external
resources. Through this method more than 99% of the portfolio companies could
be classified.
In order to calculate diversification across industries each portfolio company
was assigned uniquely to the industry class of its major operations. First, I used
the industry classification of TVE on its two-digit-level. The assignment was
made upon the description of the portfolio companies given by the investing PE
firm in the due diligence documents. To verify the classification, the results were
compared with the record of TVE for each portfolio company. 95% of all portfolio
companies could be classified.15 Secondly, to minimize the subjectivity associated
with the classification, the two-digit-classification was aggregated to nine industry
segments used by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner & Scharfstein (2005): (1) Internet
and Computers, (2) Communications and Electronics, (3) Business and Industrial,
(4) Consumer, (5) Energy and Utilities, (6) Biotechnology and Healthcare, (7)
Financial Services, (8) Business Services, and (9) Other. Gompers et al. claim that
their classification scheme groups companies that have similarities in technology
and markets. Therefore, it also qualifies for the evaluation of diversification across
industries.
Finally to compute diversification across countries, each portfolio company
was assigned to the country of its headquarters and a HHI across the fraction of
capital invested in each country was computed. The geographic location of the
headquarters was available for all portfolio companies. Table 11 in the appendix
summarizes the distribution of portfolio companies across financing stages, indus-
tries, and countries.
4.3.3 Measurement of additional variables
I calculate the continuous return of the MSCI World Index the twelve months prior
to the first investment of a PE fund (Return MSCI in vy) in order to measure the
15 The portfolio companies, which could not be classified to one of the financing stages or
industries because of missing information, were not considered for the calculation of HHI.
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condition of the global economy during fundraising. The logarithm of new funds
raised worldwide by PE firms in the vintage year of a PE fund (Funds raised
in vy) represents the economic prospect of the PE industry at the time of fund
formation.16 Fund size is measured as the logarithm of total commitments of
investors to a PE fund. To measure the experience of a PE firm at the time
of fund formation (Firm experience), I take the logarithm of the vfund sequence
number. I assume that the additional experience, which a PE firm gains in the
management of an extra fund, decreases with fund sequence number.
Funds are classified to the location of their headquarters (European headquar-
ters) and their stage focus (VC fund). I distinguish PE firms with headquarters in
the USA and Europe. A fund is categorized as VC if the fraction of its total capital
invested in VC transactions is equal to or superior to 70%. The remaining funds
are classified as PE funds. Finally, I include year fixed effects as control variables.
Because of the limited sample size, I allocate funds to groups formed by subse-
quent three years. The groups are: 1977-1979, 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1988,
1989-1991, 1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003.
5 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 2 summarizes the performance of sample funds. The average PE
fund in the sample has an IRR of 50.2% and a MIRR of 19.9% gross of manage-
ment fees and carried interests.17 The large difference between the average IRR
and the average MIRR challenges the assumption of the IRR that interim cash
flows are reinvested at same IRR. The reinvestment assumption of IRR artificially
16 The amount of new funds raised has been utilized in previous studies to proxy two different
phenomena. On the one hand, the relative amount of capital flowing into one financing
stage, industry, or country estimates the amount of money competing for the quantity of
investment opportunities in the segment (Gompers & Lerner 2000, Ljungqvist & Richardson
2003a, Kaserer & Diller 2004b). On the other hand, the total amount of capital raised by
the PE industry in a year approximates the prospect of the PE industry through investors
(Kaserer & Diller 2004b, Gottschalg et al. 2004). I use the second approach in this paper.
17 The returns in this paper are measured gross of management fees and carried interest. As a
result, they cannot be compared to the returns given in the articles of Ljungqvist & Richardson
(2003a), Jones & Rhodes-Kropf (2003), Kaserer & Diller (2004b), Gottschalg et al. (2004),
and Kaplan & Schoar (2005). The median and average net IRR of sample funds are given in
the sample selection analysis (section 4.2).
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enhances the spread between top and low performing PE funds. The minimum IRR
and minimum MIRR are nearly equal with values of 3.5% and 6.7%, respectively.
In contrast, the maximum IRR and maximum MIRR differ by 130.3 percentage
points. Hence, a big part of the high cross-sectional variance in the returns of PE
funds reported by many previous studies may be explained by the inappropriate
reinvestment assumption of the IRR. Still, there is a substantial variation across
sample funds in terms of MIRR with a standard deviation of 7.2 percentage points
and a spread between minimum and maximum MIRR of 38.7 percentage points.
With a mean PME of 3.1 gross of management fees and carried interests the av-
erage fund in the sample returned three times more than the MSCI World Index.
The minimum PME is 0.79 and the maximum PME is 11.9.
On average 34.9% of the portfolio companies in a sample fund returned less
than their investment. Of these, 15.7% did not return anything at all. Percentages
of loss vary remarkably across sample funds. The maxima are reached with 76.9%
of losses and 42.9% of total losses in a single fund. In contrast, there are funds in
the sample without any loss or total loss.
Panel B of Table 2 describes the level of diversification of PE funds in the sam-
ple. Very different levels of diversification can be observed across PE funds. Di-
versification across financing stages, industries, and countries varies substantially
across sample funds with means of 0.36, 0.64, and 0.14, and standard deviations
of 0.22, 0.18, and 0.20, respectively. The minimum level of diversification across
financing stages, industries, and countries is 0. Hence, the corresponding funds
only invest in one financing stage, industry, or country. In contrast, the maximum
level of diversification across financing stages is 0.68, across industries 0.85, and
across countries 0.81. This is equal to 4 financing stages, 9 industry segments, and
16 countries.
To further highlight the high variation of ‘systematic’ diversification across PE
funds, the least diversified PE fund in the sample only invests in 1 financing stage,
3 industries, and 1 country, whereas the most diversified fund spreads its capital
across 4 financing stages, 7 industry segments and 16 countries.
17
T
a
b
le
2
:
C
h
a
ra
ct
e
ri
st
ic
s
o
f
sa
m
p
le
fu
n
d
s
T
he
T
ab
le
ex
hi
bi
ts
m
ea
n,
m
ed
ia
n,
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n,
m
in
im
um
,
an
d
m
ax
im
um
of
th
e
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
an
d
di
ve
rs
ifi
ca
ti
on
va
ri
ab
le
s
fo
r
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
10
0
P
E
fu
nd
s.
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
of
fu
nd
s
is
m
ea
su
re
d
gr
os
s
of
m
an
ag
em
nt
fe
es
an
d
ca
rr
ie
d
in
te
re
st
s
in
te
rm
s
of
IR
R
,
M
IR
R
,
P
M
E
,
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
lo
ss
,a
nd
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
to
ta
ll
os
s
(P
an
el
A
).
D
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n
of
fu
nd
s
is
co
m
pu
te
d
ac
ro
ss
nu
m
be
r
of
po
rt
fo
lio
co
m
pa
ni
es
,t
im
e,
fin
an
ci
ng
st
ag
es
,
in
du
st
ri
es
,
an
d
co
un
tr
ie
s
(P
an
el
B
).
P
an
el
A
:
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
St
d.
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
D
ev
.
M
in
M
ax
G
ro
ss
IR
R
0.
50
2
0.
42
3
0.
31
7
0.
03
5
1.
76
3
G
ro
ss
M
IR
R
0.
17
7
0.
16
6
0.
07
1
0.
04
9
0.
43
6
G
ro
ss
P
M
E
3.
07
6
2.
29
3
2.
15
1
0.
78
6
11
.9
40
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
lo
ss
0.
34
9
0.
35
4
0.
16
7
0.
00
0
0.
76
9
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
to
ta
l
lo
ss
0.
15
7
0.
13
8
0.
10
8
0.
00
0
0.
42
9
P
an
el
B
:
D
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n
St
d.
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
D
ev
.
M
in
M
ax
N
um
be
r
of
po
rt
fo
lio
co
m
pa
ni
es
a
28
.9
23
.0
16
.8
5.
3
71
.0
D
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n
ac
ro
ss
ti
m
e
(m
on
th
s)
22
.3
20
.7
9.
1
7.
8
46
.5
D
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n
ac
ro
ss
fin
an
ci
ng
st
ag
es
0.
36
0
0.
43
2
0.
21
8
0.
00
0
0.
67
5
D
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n
ac
ro
ss
in
du
st
ri
es
0.
63
8
0.
67
8
0.
17
7
0.
00
0
0.
84
5
D
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n
ac
ro
ss
co
un
tr
ie
s
0.
14
1
0.
04
6
0.
20
3
0.
00
0
0.
81
3
a
T
o
gu
ar
an
te
e
th
e
co
nfi
de
nt
ia
lit
y
of
P
E
fir
m
s
an
d
fu
nd
s
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
th
re
e
sm
al
le
st
an
d
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
th
re
e
la
rg
es
t
va
lu
es
is
di
sp
la
ye
d
in
st
ea
d
of
m
in
im
um
an
d
m
ax
im
um
.
18
Accordingly, the number of portfolio companies and diversification across time
vary significantly across sample funds. The average fund contains 28.9 portfolio
companies and invest its capital in 22.3 months. The average of the three most
numerous funds adds up to 71 portfolio companies, whereas the average of the
three least numerous funds equals 5.3. The ‘fastest’ investing fund spends its
capital in only 7.8 months, while the ‘slowest’ investing funds needs 46.5 months.
Table 3 shows the development of rates of return and percentages of loss over
time. Because of the limited sample size, funds are arranged in groups of three
vintage years. There is a time trend towards larger returns in the sample from
a mean IRR of 26.2% in the period of 1980-1982 to a mean IRR of 64.0% in
1995-1997. Neglecting the years of 1979 and 1998, only the period between 1986-
1988 shows a decrease in mean IRR compared to the previous period. Looking
at MIRR, the trend is even more apparent with a steady rise from a mean MIRR
of 13.9% in 1980-1982 to a mean MIRR of 21.4% in 1992-1994. Only the period
between 1995-1997 shows a MIRR which is slightly lower than in the previous
period. However, the MIRR in 1995-1997 is still superior to all periods before
1992. This trend suggests that the development of the global PE market over the
sample period enabled the PE firms to increase their returns. A similar pattern is
reported by Kaplan & Schoar (2005).18 PME has a slightly different development.
The mean PME first increases from 1.37 in 1980-1982 to a maximum of 3.90 in
1986-1988. Subsequently, it declines somewhat but stays at a high level above 3.
The difference in the development of IRR and MIRR to PME can be explained by
the influence of the MSCI World Index on the PME.
The percentages of loss depict a U-shaped pattern over the sample period.
Percentages of loss and total loss fall from a level of 49.0% and 22.2% in 1979 to
a minimum of 27.1% and 10.8% in 1989-1991. Thereafter, they grow again to a
level of 52.9% and 30.1% in 1998.
18 Calculating average IRRs for the same three years groups, Table V of Kaplan & Schoar (2005)
also shows an increase in return from the period 1980-1982 to the period 1992-1994 with a
small decline in the period 1986-1988 compared to the previous period.
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Table 3: Performance measures by vintage years
The Table displays the development of IRR, MIRR, PME, percentage of loss, and percentage of
total loss gross of management fess and carried interests over the sample period from 1979 to
1998. Funds are arranged to groups of three vintage years.
Mean
Rate of Percentage
return of loss
Gross Gross Gross P(tot.Vintage year Obs.
IRR MIRR PME
P(loss)
loss)
All funds 100 0.502 0.199 3.076 0.349 0.157
1979 2 0.323 0.145 1.861 0.490 0.222
1980-1982 4 0.262 0.139 1.366 0.374 0.216
1983-1985 10 0.408 0.157 2.046 0.321 0.130
1986-1988 8 0.391 0.184 3.899 0.282 0.109
1989-1991 29 0.471 0.193 3.381 0.271 0.108
1992-1994 21 0.596 0.234 3.584 0.379 0.175
1995-1997 21 0.640 0.226 3.057 0.407 0.185
1998 5 0.344 0.151 1.855 0.529 0.301
6 Diversification and performance of private eq-
uity funds
6.1 Methodology
The descriptive analysis gives a comprehensive overview of the data. This sec-
tion aims at analyzing the impact of diversification on PE funds’ performance in
multivariate regressions. I regress performance measures on the five dimensions
of diversification: number of portfolio companies, time, financing stages, indus-
tries, and countries. Additionally, the regressions include rate of return of the
MSCI World Index in vintage year, new funds raised in vintage year, fund size,
firm experience, and dummy variables indicating funds managed by PE firms with
headquarters in Europe, VC funds, and year fixed effects, as well as a constant. I
use OLS estimation methods. The linear model has the following form:
y = β0 +
K∑
k=1
βk · xk + ε (1)
20
with y = dependent variable,
β0 = constant,
βk = parameter of independent variable xk,
xk = independent variables, and
ε = residual.
Standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and de-
pendence between the observations of one PE firm (White 1980, Rogers 1993). The
sample size of 100 PE funds is limited. Hence, before I start with the regression
analysis, a closer look is taken at the functional form of the dependent variables
as well as on collinearity issues.
In line with previous articles, the distributions of IRR, MIRR, and PME ap-
pear to be right skewed (Figure 2). Cochrane (2001) and Jones & Rhodes-Kropf
(2003) suggest that the return of PE investments and funds can be represented
best by means of a lognormal distribution. Consequently, some authors used a
logarithmic transformation of returns as dependent variables in their analyses in-
stead of the returns themselves (Hege, Palomino & Schwienbacher 2003, Cumming
& Walz 2004, Gottschalg et al. 2004). I use the Box-Cox transformation in order
to test whether logarithmic transformations of IRR, MIRR, and PME better fit
the data than the variables themselves.19 The results of the Box-Cox estimations
are presented in Table 12 in the appendix. For all variables the hypothesis that
the data is best represented by a linear functional form is rejected at the 1% level.
In contrast, for MIRR and PME the hypothesis that the data is best represented
by a logarithmic transformation cannot be rejected at least at the 10% level. For
IRR the hypothesis is rejected, but still at a lower level of significance than the
hypothesis that the data follows a linear functional form. In summary, the tests
favor a logarithmic transformation in two of three cases. Hence, I use the logarithm
of IRR, MIRR, and PME as dependent variables rather than the variables them-
selves. To be consistent with previous studies I take the logarithm of (1+IRR)
and (1+MIRR) so that log(1+IRR) and log(1+MIRR) equals zero when IRR and
MIRR are zero (Cumming & Walz 2004).
Another issue when working with small sample sizes is multi-collinearity. High
collinearity between dependent variables lowers the precision of parameter estima-
19 For further details on Box-Cox transformation and its use see Box & Cox (1964).
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tion. Neither product-moment correlations between the independent variables nor
variance inflation factors (VIFs) (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner 1990) show values
which are expected to cause serious multi-collinearity issues without one exception.
When year fixed effects are included in the regressions, there might be estimation
difficulties of the variable new funds raised in vintage year in the corresponding
regressions.
6.2 The impact of diversification on private equity funds’
rates of return
The first question I address is whether diversification has a negative impact on the
rate of return of a PE fund. The specialization hypothesis implies that specialized
PE funds achieve higher rates of return than diversified PE funds. Therefore, I
regress log(1+IRR), log(1+MIRR), and log(PME) on the five dimensions of diver-
sification and the additional variables.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize the regression results. They display the estimated
parameters, robust standard errors, and summary statistics. For all three return
variables I estimate three specifications, which vary among the dimensions of di-
versification. Specification (1) only includes ‘naive’ and ‘dynamic’ diversification.
In contrast, specification (2) solely contains the three variables of ‘systematic’ di-
versification. In specification (3) I examine all five dimensions together. Moreover,
I run a fourth regression, which incorporates year fixed effects as control variables.
The F-tests on joint significance of all parameters are significant at the 1% level
for all specifications. Moreover, the regressions explain between 19.7% and 48.0%
of the variance across sample funds’ rates of return.
In all regressions the number of portfolio companies has a positive effect on the
rate of return of PE funds. An increase in the number of portfolio companies from
25 to 35 increases IRR by 5.6 percentage points, MIRR by 1.6 percentage points,
and PME by 0.35, holding all other variables constant (Tables 4, 5, 6, columns
(4)). The coefficient is statistically significant for all regressions except for column
(3) of Table 4. Its direction and magnitude is sTable across all specifications. A
possible explanation for the positive sign is the fact that holding fund size constant,
a larger number of portfolio companies is equal to a lower average investment per
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portfolio company. Controlling also for fund types the lower average investment
per portfolio company might be associated with lower prices paid for portfolio
companies, explaining the positive effect.
According to the specialization hypothesis, the rate of return of a PE fund
declines with diversification across financing stages. The effect is statistically sig-
nificant at least at the 10% level when all dimensions of diversification and year
fixed effects are included in the regressions. Moreover, it is negative in all regres-
sions. The costs of diversification across financing stages appear to be quite high.
An increase in diversification across financing stages by one standard deviation
around its mean is connected with a decline of IRR by 6.5 percentage points, of
MIRR by 1.9 percentage points, and of PME by 0.36, all else equal (Tables 4, 5,
6, columns (4)).
In contrast, the estimated coefficients for diversification across industries are
positive in all regressions. For IRR and MIRR the relationship is statistically
significant in specifications (2) at the 10% level when the number of portfolio com-
panies and diversification across time is not included. For PME the coefficient is
statistically significant in all specifications at the 5% level. A rise in diversification
across industries by one standard deviation around its mean is linked to an increase
of MIRR by 0.7 percentage points and of PME by 0.27 (Tables 4, 5, 6, columns
(4)). This result is at odds with the specialization hypothesis which suggests that
the rate of return of a PE fund declines with diversification across industries. In
contrast, according to the data PE funds are able to diversify successfully across
industries. The benefit of additional investment opportunities in new industries
seems to be higher than the costs of diversification.
The estimated effects for diversification across time and countries are mostly
insignificant and have different directions across the various regressions. Hence,
the data suggests no systematic relationship of diversification across time and
countries with the rate of return of PE funds.
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Table 4: OLS regression for log(1+IRR)
The sample consists of 100 PE funds. The dependent variable is log(1+IRR). Independent
variables include number of portfolio companies, diversification across time, diversification across
financing stages, diversification across industries, diversification across countries, rate of return
of the MSCI World Index in vintage year, new funds raised in vintage year, fund size, and firm
experience. Additionally, the regressions contain dummy variables indicating funds managed by
PE firms with headquarters in Europe and VC funds, as well as a constant. The Table reports
estimated coefficients and robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: log(1+IRR)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of portfolio companies 0.002∗ 0.003 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Div. across time (months) -0.005∗ -0.005∗ -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Div. across financing stages -0.085 -0.143 -0.202∗
(0.099) (0.111) (0.107)
Div. across industries 0.185∗ 0.140 0.132
(0.106) (0.115) (0.114)
Div. across. countries -0.002 -0.034 -0.112
(0.074) (0.089) (0.109)
Return MSCI in vy -0.490∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗
(0.171) (0.141) (0.167) (0.175)
Funds raised in vy (log bil. USD 2000) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.044
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.065)
Fund size (log mil. USD 2000) -0.064∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Firm experience 0.035 0.020 0.027 0.012
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025)
European headquarter (0/1) -0.077 -0.110∗ -0.092 -0.077
(0.050) (0.061) (0.063) (0.069)
VC fund (0/1) -0.115∗∗ -0.084∗ -0.128∗∗ -0.128∗
(0.055) (0.049) (0.056) (0.065)
Constant 0.622∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗
(0.159) (0.151) (0.171) (0.350)
Year F.E. No No No Yes
F-statistic 9.3 12.3 9.6 18.5
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.197 0.184 0.227 0.309
R2-adjusted 0.126 0.103 0.131 0.155
Number of observations 100 100 100 100
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for serial correlation,
heteroscedasticity and dependence between observations of one PE firm.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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Table 5: OLS regression for log(1+MIRR)
The sample consists of 100 PE funds. The dependent variable is log(1+MIRR). Independent
variables include number of portfolio companies, diversification across time, diversification across
financing stages, diversification across industries, diversification across countries, rate of return
of the MSCI World Index in vintage year, new funds raised in vintage year, fund size, and firm
experience. Additionally, the regressions contain dummy variables indicating funds managed by
PE firms with headquarters in Europe and VC funds, as well as a constant. The Table reports
estimated coefficients and robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: log(1+MIRR)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of portfolio companies 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Div. across time (months) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Div. across financing stages -0.030 -0.050 -0.071∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Div. across industries 0.053∗ 0.033 0.034
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Div. across. countries 0.036 0.020 -0.011
(0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
Return MSCI in vy -0.135∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗
(0.047) (0.039) (0.047) (0.043)
Funds raised in vy (log bil. USD 2000) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018)
Fund size (log mil. USD 2000) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm experience 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
European headquarter (0/1) -0.035∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
VC fund (0/1) -0.032∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
Constant 0.214∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.046) (0.096)
Year F.E. No No No Yes
F-statistic 9.6 8.5 11.2 20.9
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.250 0.249 0.284 0.407
R2-adjusted 0.184 0.174 0.195 0.275
Number of observations 100 100 100 100
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for serial correlation,
heteroscedasticity and dependence between observations of one PE firm.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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Table 6: OLS regression for log(PME)
The sample consists of 100 PE funds. The dependent variable is log(PME). Independent variables
include number of portfolio companies, diversification across time, diversification across financing
stages, diversification across industries, diversification across countries, rate of return of the MSCI
World Index in vintage year, new funds raised in vintage year, fund size, and firm experience.
Additionally, the regressions contain dummy variables indicating funds managed by PE firms
with headquarters in Europe and VC funds, as well as a constant. The Table reports estimated
coefficients and robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: log(PME)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of portfolio companies 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Div. across time (months) 0.006 0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Div. across financing stages -0.302 -0.566∗∗ -0.633∗∗
(0.241) (0.247) (0.235)
Div. across industries 0.962∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗ 0.582∗∗
(0.299) (0.270) (0.284)
Div. across. countries 0.404∗ 0.058 -0.124
(0.212) (0.210) (0.253)
Return MSCI in vy -1.331∗∗∗ -1.152∗∗ -1.362∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗∗
(0.440) (0.459) (0.440) (0.407)
Funds raised in vy (log bil. USD 2000) 0.188∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.075
(0.048) (0.056) (0.044) (0.161)
Fund size (log mil. USD 2000) -0.161∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.052) (0.036) (0.043)
Firm experience 0.112∗ 0.143 0.087 0.067
(0.064) (0.088) (0.061) (0.062)
European headquarter (0/1) -0.376∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.117) (0.120) (0.130)
VC fund (0/1) -0.416∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.093) (0.106) (0.124)
Constant 0.980∗∗ 1.101∗∗ 0.998∗∗ 1.705∗
(0.397) (0.423) (0.408) (0.858)
Year F.E. No No No Yes
F-statistic 17.5 8.7 34.6 31.0
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.346 0.339 0.402 0.480
R2-adjusted 0.289 0.273 0.327 0.364
Number of observations 100 100 100 100
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for serial correlation,
heteroscedasticity and dependence between observations of one PE firm.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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The regressions further display interesting results in comparison with previous
studies on the performance of PE funds. Consistent with Kaserer & Diller (2004b),
I find a strong negative link between rate of return of the MSCI World Index in
vintage year and rate of return of a PE fund which is statistically significant at
least at the 5% level in all regressions. A well performing global economy at the
time of fund formation forces PE firms to pay high prices for their investments
lowering the rate of return of their funds, all else equal. Varying the rate of return
of the MSCI World Index in vintage year by one standard deviation from 4.7% to
14.7% leads to a decline of IRR of 6.6 percentage points, MIRR of 1.3 percentage
points, and PME of 0.31, holding all other variables constant (Tables 4, 5, 6,
columns (4)).
The data also supports the positive relationship between the amount of new
funds raised by the global PE industry in the vintage year of a fund and its rate
of return. Raising the logarithm of new funds raised in the vintage year by one
standard deviation across its mean, increases IRR by 5.1 percentage points, MIRR
by 0.7 percentage points, and PME by 0.15, holding all other variables constant
(Tables 4, 5, 6, columns (3)). This result backs the argumentation that the total
amount of new funds raised by the PE industry in a year is a signal for future
investment opportunities (Kaserer & Diller 2004b, Gottschalg et al. 2004). As
expected by the multi-collinearity analysis, the coefficient of new funds raised in
vintage year loses its significance when year fixed effects are included. The amount
of new funds raised has grown nearly constantly over the sample period according
to the statistics of TVE. Only in the years 1990 and 1991, TVE quotes a decline
of new funds raised compared to the previous year.
Consistent with Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg et al. (2004), the
relationship between the experience of a PE firm at the time of fund formation
and the rate of return is positive for all specifications. Yet it is only statistically
significant at the 10% level for MIRR when year fixed effects are not included.20
20 Kaplan & Schoar (2005) report that for their sample the positive correlation between firm
experience and funds’ rates of return is only valid in cross section. Controlling for firm
fixed effects they find a negative relationship between both variables. This suggests that
the positive relation between firm experience and funds’ rates of return in cross section is
mainly caused by selection. Successful PE firms are able to raise follow-on funds, whereas
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Furthermore, I find a return difference between European and US PE funds,
which is statistically significant at the 1% level for MIRR and PME, corroborating
the result of Gottschalg et al. (2004). Over the sample period US PE funds achieved
on average 4.8 percentage points higher MIRR and a 1.15 higher PME than their
European equivalents, all else equal (Tables 5, 6, columns (4)).
However, contrary to the findings of Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Gottschalg
et al. (2004), I find returns to decrease linearly with the logarithm of total commit-
ments. A growth in fund size by one standard deviation around its mean lowers
IRR by 11.4 percentage points, MIRR by 2.9 percentage points, and PME by 0.62,
holding all other variables constant (Tables 4, 5, 6, columns (4)).21 There are two
possible explanations for this result. On the one hand, if one has a closer look at
the results reported by Kaplan & Schoar (2005), the IRR maximizing fund size
for their sample is USD 90 million in 1990 purchasing power.22 The returns of
funds larger than the optimal value decline with fund size because the number of
attractive companies in the economy is limited at each point in time (Kaplan &
Schoar 2005). In comparison, 56 funds in the sample have a fund size above USD
90 million in 1990 purchasing power. The three largest funds even have an average
fund size of USD 3,618 million in 1990 purchasing power. Hence, the majority of
sample funds lie far above the optimal fund size of Kaplan & Schoar (2005) which
might cause the negative sign in the regressions. On the other hand, controlling
for the portfolio strategy of a PE fund may induce the sign change. For instance,
holding number of portfolio companies constant, a larger fund size is associated
with a larger average investment per portfolio company. Simultaneously control-
ling for fund type, the larger average investment per portfolio company might be
equal to higher prices paid for portfolio companies, which would also explain the
negative effect of fund size.
unsuccessful PE firms are not. Because of the limited size of the sample, I am not able to
approve this hypothesis.
21 The inclusion of a quadratic term of fund size in an unreported regression does not change
the direction of the effect.
22 Kaplan & Schoar (2005) report in Table VIII, column two, a coefficient of log(size) of 0.18
and of log(size)2 of -0.02. They measure fund size in USD million in 1990 purchasing power.
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Finally, VC funds in the sample return less than BO funds. The difference
between both groups totals up to 18.6 percentage points in IRR, 4.6 percentage
points in MIRR, and 1.20 in PME, all else equal (Tables 4, 5, 6, columns (4)).
This result is at odds with Kaplan & Schoar (2005) and Kaserer & Diller (2004b)
and might be explained by the superior return of sample funds.23 Whereas VC
funds achieve higher rates of return than BO funds in the universe of PE funds,
comparing the rate of return of both groups only for the ‘top-half’ of PE funds,
BO funds perform better than VC funds. An alternative explanation is that the
quality of BO firms to which the fund-of-funds investor had access is superior to
the quality of VC firms.
6.3 The impact of diversification on private equity funds’
percentages of loss
The specialization hypothesis suggests that by means of specialization, PE firms
are able to make superior selection decisions and to provide their portfolio compa-
nies with more value adding services. Consequently, specialized PE funds should
lose fewer of there portfolio companies. In the following I test this hypothesis re-
gressing percentage of loss, i.e., the fraction of portfolio companies with a return of
less than 0%, and percentage of total loss, i.e., the fraction of portfolio companies
with a rate of return of -100%, on the five dimensions of diversification.
Table 7 and 8 display the results of OLS estimation of percentage of loss and
probability of total loss.24 For both measures I again estimate three specifications
varying across the dimensions of diversification. Specification (1) restrains the
analysis to number of portfolio companies and diversification across time, while
specification (2) includes the three dimensions of ‘systematic’ diversification, which
are: diversification across financing stages, industries, and countries. In specifica-
tion (3) all five variables of diversification are examined together. Additionally, I
estimate a fourth specification which includes year fixed effects as control variables.
23 Compare sample selection analysis in section 4.2.
24 There are four funds in the sample which have a percentage of loss of zero and nine funds
which have a percentage of total loss. As a consequence a Tobit model with left-censoring at
zero would be more accurate. However, due to the small number of censored observations,
the estimated coefficients are marginally different from the OLS estimations.
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The F-tests on joint significance of all parameters are significant at the 1% level for
all specifications. Specification (4) explains 55.0% of the variation of percentage
of loss and 40.5% of the variation of percentage of total loss across sample funds.
In line with the specialization hypothesis, diversification across financing stages
enhances percentages of loss and total loss. The effects are statistically significant
at least at the 5% level and sTable in magnitude across all specifications. A stan-
dard deviation change in diversification across financing stages raises the fraction
of losses in a PE fund by 4.8 percentage points and the fraction of total losses by
3.1 percentage points, holding all other variables constant (Tables 7 and 8, columns
(4)). PE firms investing in multiple financing stages seem either to fund a higher
fraction of low quality companies or to give less management support compared
to PE firms which invest in fewer financing stages.
According to the rate of return, the coefficient for diversification across indus-
tries is negative in all specification for both percentages of loss. PE funds which
are diversified across a broad range of industries appear to lose less of their port-
folio companies than PE funds focused on certain industries. However, the effects
are not statistically significant.
Diversification across countries does not seem to have a systematic effect on
percentage of loss and total loss. The coefficients of diversification across countries
are statistically insignificant and change signs across the various specifications.
Additionally, an increasing number of portfolio companies seems to be asso-
ciated with a rise in percentage of loss and diversification across time appears to
lower the percentage of loss in a PE fund, returning less than their investment.
However, the coefficients of both variables become insignificant when year fixed
effects are introduced.
Moreover, a growing amount of new funds raised in the vintage year of a PE
fund enhances the percentages of loss. A doubling in the amount of new funds
raised is associated with a 10.5 percentage points higher fraction of losses and a
5.7 percentage points higher fraction of total losses in a PE fund, all else equal
(Tables 7 and 8, columns (4)). PE firms fund a disproportionately high fraction
of low quality investments when a large amount of capital is available.
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Table 7: OLS regression for percentage of loss
The sample consists of 100 PE funds. The dependent variable is percentage of loss, i.e., the
fraction of portfolio companies in a PE fund returning less than 0%. Independent variables
include number of portfolio companies, diversification across time, diversification across financing
stages, diversification across industries, diversification across countries, rate of return of the MSCI
World Index in vintage year, new funds raised in vintage year, fund size, and firm experience.
Additionally, the regressions contain dummy variables indicating funds managed by PE firms
with headquarters in Europe and VC funds, as well as a constant. The Table reports estimated
coefficients and robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: probability of loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of portfolio companies 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Div. across time (months) -0.005∗ -0.004∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Div. across financing stages 0.297∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.075) (0.078)
Div. across industries -0.093 -0.133 -0.121
(0.111) (0.094) (0.098)
Div. across. countries 0.029 0.000 0.020
(0.080) (0.083) (0.085)
Return MSCI in vy 0.000 0.111 0.022 0.024
(0.140) (0.131) (0.140) (0.138)
Funds raised in vy (log bil. USD 2000) 0.055∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.041)
Fund size (log mil. USD 2000) -0.015 0.016 0.001 -0.002
(0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020)
Firm experience 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.017
(0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030)
European headquarter (0/1) -0.002 0.004 0.020 0.016
(0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044)
VC fund (0/1) 0.124∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.053) (0.043) (0.048) (0.050)
Constant 0.193 -0.055 0.122 -0.141
(0.169) (0.126) (0.165) (0.223)
Year F.E. No No No Yes
F-statistic 18.2 12.3 16.3 11.5
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.418 0.471 0.509 0.550
R2-adjusted 0.367 0.418 0.447 0.450
Number of observations 100 100 100 100
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for serial correlation,
heteroscedasticity and dependence between observations of one PE firm.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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Table 8: OLS regression for percentage of total loss
The sample consists of 100 PE funds. The dependent variable is percentage of total loss, i.e., the
fraction of portfolio companies in a PE fund returning nothing. Independent variables include
number of portfolio companies, diversification across time, diversification across financing stages,
diversification across industries, diversification across countries, rate of return of the MSCI World
Index in vintage year, new funds raised in vintage year, fund size, and firm experience. Addi-
tionally, the regressions contain dummy variables indicating funds managed by PE firms with
headquarters in Europe and VC funds, as well as a constant. The Table reports estimated
coefficients and robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: prob. of total loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of portfolio companies 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Div. across time (months) -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Div. across financing stages 0.140∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗
(0.041) (0.047) (0.054)
Div. across industries -0.078 -0.049 -0.032
(0.097) (0.088) (0.090)
Div. across. countries -0.016 0.012 0.033
(0.054) (0.066) (0.066)
Return MSCI in vy 0.019 0.039 0.037 0.044
(0.113) (0.120) (0.121) (0.130)
Funds raised in vy (log bil. USD 2000) 0.034∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.057∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.032)
Fund size (log mil. USD 2000) -0.004 0.011 0.006 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Firm experience 0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
European headquarter (0/1) -0.033 -0.015 -0.028 -0.038
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026)
VC fund (0/1) 0.064 0.081∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.065∗
(0.040) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033)
Constant 0.075 -0.044 0.015 -0.106
(0.117) (0.110) (0.123) (0.155)
Year F.E. No No No Yes
F-statistic 4.7 7.4 6.6 16.8
p-value of F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.244 0.300 0.321 0.405
R2-adjusted 0.178 0.230 0.236 0.273
Number of observations 100 100 100 100
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for serial correlation,
heteroscedasticity and dependence between observations of one PE firm.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%
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Finally, as expected, VC funds have significantly higher percentages of loss
than BO funds. Holding all other variables constant, a VC fund has a 13.5 per-
centage points higher fraction of losses and a 6.5 percentage points higher fraction
of total losses than a BO fund, all else equal (Tables 7 and 8, columns (3)). VC
funds invest mainly in companies which are in their early stages of development.
The selection process of early stage companies is characterized by a scarcity of
objective information making it difficult to judge the success and survival of these
companies. In comparison, established companies, which are the focus of BO
funds, have a long history of activity. The scarcity of objective information leads
to higher percentages of loss and total loss in VC funds relative to BO funds. The
remaining variables do not have a significant influence on percentages of loss and
total loss.
7 Additional Robustness Checks
This section summarizes additional analyses I undertook to determine whether the
basic findings are robust.
The distributions of IRR, MIRR, and PME are right skewed. Box-Cox-transformations
favor a logarithmic functional form instead of a linear functional form. Conse-
quently, I utilized the lograithm of IRR, MIRR, and PME as dependent variables.
To validate this choice, I repeated the regressions for rate of return using IRR,
MIRR, and PME as dependent variables. Precision of some parameters is less.
However, the results are similar with the regressions for logarithmized variables
with respect to effect size and sign.
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Indices might be inappropriate to measure diversifica-
tion across financing stages, industries, and countries. The effect of diversification
might not depend on the distribution of a funds’ capital across various classes. In-
stead, it might depend only on the number of classes a PE fund invests in. In order
to evaluate this assumption, I rerun all regressions using the number of financing
stages, the number of industries, and the number of countries to approximate the
level of ‘systematic’ diversification in a PE fund. The main results do not change.
First, a larger number of financing stages is associated with lower rates of return
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and higher percentages of loss. Secondly, the number of industries is positively
correlated with rates of return. Finally, the number of countries has no significant
effect on one of the performance measures.
Analysis of selection biases has shown that the sample contains a survivorship
bias. Sample funds have superior rates of return in comparison to the universe of
PE funds provided by TVE. However, descriptive analysis reveals large variations
of the rates of return and the levels of diversification in sample funds. Conse-
quently, the survivorship bias is not expected to influence the relationship between
diversification and performance in a way, so that it differs significantly between the
sample and the population of PE funds. In order to analyze the influence of the
superior performance, I exclude the upper quartile of sample funds according to
gross IRR. The remaining 75 funds have an mean gross IRR of 34.9%, mean gross
MIRR of 17.0% and a mean gross PME of 2.36. Rerunning the regressions shows
the following results. There is still a negative relationship between diversification
across financing stages and rates of return as well as a positive relation between
diversification across financing stages and percentages of loss. The effect size and
significance of diversification across financing stages is identical to the regressions
with all observations. Yet, the effect of diversification across industries becomes
loses most of its magnitude and significance. In some specifications it even be-
comes negative, though not statistically significant. Hence, the top quartile of the
sample funds seems to benefit more from diversification across industries than the
lower three quartiles. The top quartile of sample funds are successfully able to
extract return from investment opportunities in different industries.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze the impact of diversification on the perfor-
mance of PE funds. While the return of PE financing has received a tremendous
amount of attention from academic researchers, the role of diversification in PE
funds has obtained little systematic consideration. The information asymmetries
and principal agent conflicts inherent in the selection and oversight of private com-
panies suggest that PE funds specialized on specific financing stages, industries,
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or countries earn higher rates of return and lose less of their portfolio companies
than diversified PE funds. Studying an unique sample of 100 PE funds containing
information about 2,871 investments, a large variation across the diversification
levels of PE funds are found. While some PE funds are highly specialized, others
are highly diversified.
Multivariate regression analyses find only partial evidence that the rate of re-
turn of PE funds declines with ‘systematic’ diversification. In line with the special-
ization hypothesis, the rate of return of sample funds decreases with diversification
across financing stages. However, in contrast to the specialization hypothesis, the
rate of return of sample funds increases with diversification across industries. The
benefits of additional investment opportunities in various industries appear to be
higher than the costs of diversification across industries. Excluding the upper
quartile of sample funds with respect to gross IRR suggests that this relationship
is mainly true for the top quartile of sample funds. These funds benefit more from
diversification across industries than the lower three quartiles. They are able to
extract positive returns from investments in various industries. This observation
backs the argumentation that PE firms should apply an opportunistic investment
approach. PE firms should specialize on process know-how which is independent
from specific industries or countries in order to be able to invest in any portfolio
company which promises high returns regardless of their technology or country of
operation. Finally, no impact of diversification across countries on rate of return of
PE funds is found. The same is true for diversification across time. Additionally,
I find rate of return of PE funds to enhance with number of portfolio companies.
Accordingly, the percentages of loss and total loss in PE funds increase with
diversification across financing stages. PE firms investing in multiple financing
stages seem either to fund a higher fraction of low quality companies or to give
less management support compared to PE firms which invest in fewer financing
stages.
Additional analyses show that the results hold for various performance mea-
sures and are robust against a change in the functional form and alternative defi-
nition of diversification across financing stages, industries, and financing stages.
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The findings have several implications for the management of and investment
in PE funds. There seems to be rather limited influence of diversification on the
performance of PE funds. Despite prevailing opinion, these results suggest no re-
turn premium of funds specialized on certain industries or countries compared to
diversified funds. PE funds which are specialized on particular industries or coun-
tries do not seem to make superior selection decisions or to provide their portfolio
companies with more value adding services than diversified PE funds. There are
two complimentary explanations for this observation. First, the advantage of PE
firms specialized on particular industries or countries to overcome the information
asymmetries and principal agent problems inherent in the selection and oversight
of private companies is limited. Either the specialized know-how is less important
than assumed or the know-how can be purchased from specialists outside the PE
firm. An alternative explanation for the result is that PE firms are specialized
within their organization. Single PE managers are specialized on certain indus-
tries or countries. As a result, diversified PE firms can overcome the information
asymmetries and principal agent problems inherent in the selection and oversight
of private companies as well as specialized PE firms.
However, there are some caveats to consider. First, the data set used in this
chapter is limited in size and biased towards larger and older BO funds with supe-
rior return in comparison to the universe of PE funds. Therefore, future research
should repeat the analysis undertaken in this chapter with a larger and less bi-
ased data set. Secondly, the sample includes 100 PE funds managed by 34 PE
firms. Some results might be caused by unobserved differences between the PE
firms rather than the studied variables. Yet, the size and structure of the data
set inhibit the ability to control for firm fixed effects. Finally, the measures of
‘systematic’ diversification are not capturing all aspects of diversification. The
literature on the impact of diversification in big sized public companies find quan-
titative diversification measures to explain less of financial success than qualitative
diversification measures (Hall & John 1994). However, applying qualitative diver-
sification measures similar to the relation-ratios of Rumelt on a sample of portfolio
companies appears to be an unpractical task (Rumelt 1974, Rumelt 1982). For
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the sample the relation of the businesses of 2,871 portfolio companies have to be
judged, demanding an unavailable amount of information and time.
To conclude, this paper is the first systematic analysis of the impact of di-
versification on PE funds’ performance. It contributes to the growing amount of
literature analyzing the investment behavior and performance of PE firms. The
unique data set allowed for the first time to measure exactly the diversification of
PE funds across various dimensions and to evaluate the relationship between these
dimensions and the performance of sample funds. The results should prove to be
important for both the research community as well as practitioners.
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A Appendix
Figure 1: Distribution of sample across vintage years
The Figure shows the distribution of observations across vintage years. The sample contains 100
PE funds with vintage years between 1979 and 1998. PE funds are divided into liquidated and
active funds. Active funds have a NAV larger than zero. Liquidated funds have no NAV any
more. Vintage year is defined as the year of the first investment of a fund.
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Figure 2: Histograms of performance measures
The sample contains 100 PE funds. The Figure shows histograms of the performance measures.
Panel A includes histograms of IRR, MIRR, and PME. Panel B displays histograms of percentage
of loss and total loss. The y-axis is scaled so that the sum of the bars’ areas equals one.
Panel A: Rate of return
0
. 5
1
1 .
5
2
D
e n
s i
t y
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Gross IRR
0
2
4
6
8
D
e n
s i
t y
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Gross MIRR
0
. 1
. 2
. 3
. 4
D
e n
s i
t y
0 5 10 15
Gross PME
Panel B: Percentage of loss
0
1
2
3
4
D
e n
s i
t y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
probability of loss
0
1
2
3
4
5
D
e n
s i
t y
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
probability of total loss
44
Table 9: Mathematical definition of rate of return
Internal rate of return (IRR)
0 =
T∑
t=0
(∑N
i=1 CFit
(1 + IRR)t
)
with CFit = cash flow of portfolio company i in period t.
Modified internal rate of return (MIRR)
MIRR = T
√√√√√∑Tt=0
[(∑N
i=1 CFit
)
· (1 + r)T−t · pt
]
∑T
t=0
[(∑N
i=1 CFit
)
· (1 + r)−t · nt
]
with r = discount rate for interim cash flows,
pt =
{
1 if in period t
∑N
i=1 CFit ≥ 0
0 else,
nt =
{
1 if in period t
∑N
i=1 CFit < 0
0 else.
Public market equivalent (PME )
PME =
∑T
t=0
[(∑N
i=1 CFit
)
/
(∏t
k=0 (1 + rk)
)
· pt
]
∑T
t=0
[(∑N
i=1 CFit
)
/
(∏t
l=0 (1 + rl)
)
· nt
] (2)
with rk, rl = discrete return of the public market index in period k or l,
pt =
{
1 if in period t
∑N
i=1 CFit ≥ 0
0 else,
nt =
{
1 if in period t
∑N
i=1 CFit < 0
0 else.
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Table 10: Definition of financing stages
To measure diversification across financing stages, each portfolio company was assigned to a
financing stage. In order to do so, the following definitions were used
• Venture capital : The term VC is used to describe the provision of equity or equity linked
capital to young, high growth companies which have a limited history of operation
(Gompers & Lerner 2004). According to the status of operation, VC is divided into
(AltAssets 2005, Thomson Venture Economics 2005):
– Seed / early stage venture capital : Seed capital refers to the provision of very
early stage finance to a company which has not yet been established. Seed capital
is often provided before venture capitalists become involved. Early stage VC is
provided to companies which have been recently established. It is used for product
development, as well as initial marketing, manufacturing and sales activities.
– Expansion / second stage venture capital : It is provided for the first expansion
of a company, which is already in production and shipment. The company is
experiencing growth in inventory and accounts receivable.
– Later / third stage venture capital : The term denominates funding of a company,
which has sTable operations and is breaking even or profiTable. The capital is
used for further growth of the company.
• Buyout capital : A BO is the purchase of a company or a controlling interest of a cor-
poration’s shares or some part of business (AltAssets 2005). The focus of BO capital
are mature companies with a proven track record. Various types of BOs can be divided
emphasizing each one important element of the transaction. The most important are
leveraged BO (LBO), management BO (MBO), management buyin (MBI), recapital-
ization, and turnaround. The majority of classifications also assign mezzanine financing
to BO capital because it is mostly used in BO transactions.
• Listed securities: In some cases PE firms buy shares of companies which are listed on
public stock exchanges. Often these companies have been funded by the same PE firm
years ago in a private transaction.
• Other financing stage: The category other financing stage was used for companies,
which did not fit in one of the other categories.
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Table 11: Classification of portfolio companies
Each portfolio company was assigned to a financing state, an industry, and a country. The Table
displays the distribution of portfolio companies across the three classifications.
Panel A: Financing stages
# of portfolio companies %
Seed / early stage venture capital 877 30.68
Second, expansion and later stage venture capital 1,057 36.97
Buyout 882 30.85
Listed securities 13 0.45
Other financing stage 30 1.05
All portfolio companies 2,859 100.00
Panel B: Industries
# of portfolio companies %
Internet and Computer 862 31.43
Communications and Electronics 400 14.59
Business and Industrial 245 8.93
Consumer, 318 11.60
Energy and Utilities 57 2.08
Biotechnology and Healthcare 530 19.33
Financial Services 137 5.00
Business Services 176 6.42
Other 17 0.62
All portfolio companies 2,742 100.00
continued
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Table 11 – Continued
Panel B: Countries
Country # of portfolio companies %
Argentina 1 0.03
Austria 2 0.07
Belgium 4 0.14
Bermuda 3 0.10
Brazil 2 0.07
Canada 25 0.87
China 5 0.17
Czech Republic 1 0.03
Denmark 7 0.24
France 139 4.84
Germany 101 3.52
Hong Kong 4 0.14
Iceland 2 0.07
India 2 0.07
Indonesia 4 0.14
Israel 21 0.73
Italy 52 1.81
Japan 1 0.03
Malaysia 1 0.03
Netherlands 14 0.49
Norway 1 0.03
Philippines 2 0.07
Poland 1 0.03
Portugal 1 0.03
Republic of Ireland 6 0.21
Romania 1 0.03
Singapore 2 0.07
Spain 11 0.38
Sweden 18 0.63
Switzerland 12 0.42
Taiwan 2 0.07
Thailand 1 0.03
United Kingdom 306 10.66
United States of America 2,116 73.70
All portfolio companies 2,871 100.00
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